

PART III CREATING AND MANAGING FESTIVAL ORGANIZATION

Chapter 12

Postmodern Narrative and Festival

What does it mean to narrative festively? To ask a simple question, do you know how the products and services you consume get produced, who produces them, in short, the life and death story of their journey to market? A festival narration is defined as envisioning and embodying our life in a *living story* of material production and consumption in ways that allows us to slay the dragon of spectacle addictive scripts and the masks of *distributed violence*. To create and embody the living story will sound easy; we merely trace the distributed violence of our own production and consumption. Yet, to do this requires bridging several complex narrative positions in Table One.

My own interdisciplinary work is a critical theory plus postmodern and poststructuralist storytelling approach. For lack of a better label, I will call it *critical postmodern narrative theory*. It is a reembodyment of the living story within the contexts of political economy. To be disembodied means we consume without knowing the critical life and death stories; we live then in disembodied and only sometimes-embodied and other-aware stories of consumption and production. Critical postmodern narrative theory re-embodies spectacle in a naked account of distributed violence and acts of life creation and in ways to live simply.

Distributed violence means that while we may not personally slay the animals we eat, chain saw the rainforest trees we nail, watch mind-numbing hours of violent TV, directly subject workers to toxic environments, or ourselves manage the slave-wage sweatshops that produce our garments, we are nevertheless complicit. Festive narration tells the story of the long link consumptive and productive spectacle chains of violence so we see the slaughter face-to-face, not through the simulated spectacle of video games, movies, TV episodes, or violent-corporate advertising. And some corporations are decidedly less violent than others. The question is how to move them all to less violent engagement with humans, animals, trees, planet, and cosmos.

This is the point of staring into the violence abyss. Festive narration allows us to choose our own material journey in simplicity and awareness of our complicity in life and death struggle. Festive narration traces from whence the spectacle of violence we consume emerges, rather than living a fantasy characterization set in spectacle theatrics masking predatory culture. Festive narration is to gaze the spectacle dragon from its tail to its mouth, with a critical eye, and then to choose to produce and consume according to our life-affirming storylines, not one scripted in the dragon's media masking the breathing fire of hyper-work and conspicuous-consumption. Riddled through spectacle are acts of festive narration and vice versa (what below we shall explore as double logic). Indeed the main point of this chapter is that life and death are part of festivalism, just as they are part of capitalism, but in different proportions, and in different awareness. Before defining festivalism, I need to introduce a postmodern narrative device, faciality (a term I borrow from Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

Festive narration depicts and illuminates the death mask of spectacle, even the face behind the mask. Festive narration tells the stories of the journey of the product to market, including both the acts of life and death that construct what we dare consume. Festive narration traces the performance of a surrogate spectator, seductively modeling our addicted performance on the material stage of production and consumption while narrating it as the journey to happiness, a happy face of a happy society. Festive narration deconstructs the façade of spectacle corporate knowledge in narration, highlighting its deadening makeup. Festive narration reads the signature of spectacle, tracing the imprints of its faciality. Faciality is the self-narrative of capitalism as spectacle and it is a self-destructing remove of the mask to see the face of production and consumption. Festive narration is the stripping away of layers of narrative disguise and performative makeup to reveal the materiality of producing and consuming. It is a stripping away that spectacle self-engages, for even without our festive narration the mask is constantly self-destructing and also reconstructing. The makeup is always self-destructing in acts of spectacle self-awareness. And choices are made to invent new masks or give new face. My point is festival narration

recovers something in the faciality of capitalism that was there in the first place. The mask is always self-destructing to reveal the face of producers and consumers. We shall explore several Nike narrative devices of faciality in our next chapter, including ways to achieve less violent production.

Table One: Narrative Worldviews

<p>Narrative Worldviews (See Table Two for details of epistemology, ontology & method)</p> <p>Realist Narratology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Harvard cases in their mimics ✓ Management guru story collections (out of storied context) ✓ Logical positivist experiments ✓ Story as in-place metering device of culture, etc. <p>Structuralist Narratology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Russian Formalists (Propp & Shklovsky) ✓ American structuralism (James, Lubbock, Booth, & Chatman) ✓ French Structuralists (early Barthes, Todorov, Bremond, Greimas, Pavel, Prince, & Levi-Strauss) ✓ Formal linguistics ✓ Folktale index ✓ Peirce's Semiotic sign systems ✓ Austin & Searle's Speech Act Theory ✓ Burkean Act Scene Ratio ✓ Frye's plot types ✓ Sacks' conversation analysis of story starts and turns. ✓ Fisher's Narrative Paradigm Theory ✓ Sociolinguistics <p>Social Constructionist Narratology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Interpretivist ✓ Constructivist ✓ Social Constructivist <p>Poststructuralist Narratology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Deconstruction ✓ Supplementarity ✓ Double Logic ✓ Discourse Archaeology <p>Critical Theorist Narratology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Situating narrative in class, gender, race, ethnicity, and economic materiality (e.g. Marx and Frankfurt School). ✓ How ideological power is constituted in discourse (e.g. Fairclough, 1992). <p>Postmodernist Narratology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Critique of grand narratives in favor of local narratives ✓ Fragmentation of self into polyvocal narration ✓ Affirmative and skeptical positions ✓ Genealogical discourse 	<p>Critical Postmodern Narrative Theory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Debord (1967) Society of the Spectacle (part of Situationist movement); its critical and postmodern reading by Best & Kellner (1997) Postmodern Turn ✓ Francese (1997) narrating Postmodern Time and Space seeking a return to late modern ✓ Lyotard (1997) Postmodern Fables ✓ Bauman (1997) Postmodernity and its Discontents ✓ Iggers (1997) Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge ✓ Currie (1998) Postmodern Narrative Theory ✓ Dixon (1998) The Transparency of Spectacle: Meditations on the Moving Image. ✓ Deleuze & Guattari (1987) A Thousand Plateaus (e.g. rhizomatic, BwO, & faciality theory) ✓ Postmodern storytelling organization theory (Boje, 1995, 1999b; Boje, Luhman & Baack, 1999). Boje (1998a,b,c, 1999b) campaign to reform Nike's spectacle and story spin cycles into realization of living wage and living work conditions. ✓ Burrell (1997) Pandemonium. A postmodern genealogical analysis of the peasantry in organization theory <p>Living Story Theory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Barre Toelken (1996) chapter. ✓ Kaylynn TwoTrees (1997) presentation. ✓ Robin Clair (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997) articles.
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Festivalism is my narrative transformative to capitalism by telling and showing critical postmodern stories of its faciality. Festivalism is what I call a critical postmodern narrative theory realized in acts of festive narration about the faciality and materiality of capitalism. In festive narration we author our own self-aware story of production and consumption and construct our own stage. In festivalism we reinvoke Adam Smith's (partial, impartial, and ideal) moral spectators to witness and gaze our economic choices. Festive narration is a critical postmodern living story of choices of animal, use, earth use, and people use and it is just picking up Adam Smith's call for a kinder and gentler capitalism brought into being through spectator awareness. In festivalism we script the self-worth of our character, instead of passively accepting someone else's addicted to spectacle hero for us to mimic. We see our partiality in the distributed violence. In festivalism we gaze the spectacle and say, "that is not how I see myself." "That is not the hero of my journey." Spectator awareness is the first practical step.

Festivalism is the nonviolent resistance to the most violent aspects of capitalism (Sinclair's *Jungle* and the factory farms) and the seemingly harmless violence of Nintendo and Sony killing games. Festive narration traces products and services to the roots of their creation and destruction. Festivalism highlights its more nonviolent pathways of animal testing, sports, cyber-entertainment, and slave labor; spectacle masks its more violent pathways with stories of progress, fun, and materialism that festive narration deconstructs. In sum, critical postmodern narrative theories are the heart of festivalism. The purpose of this chapter is to review these theories. I will apply them over the next two chapters. Festivalism is the transformative narration of capitalism into more life affirming production and consumption.

Table One presents an overview of narrative worldviews, positioning our focus, critical postmodern narrative theories. There are many competing narrative paradigms that have different authors, ontologies, epistemologies and methods (left side of Table One). Here is a embarrassingly brief narrative of the narrative positions. It becomes the work of the festival to embody living story and to critique the killing off of living story in various analytic dissections by the

various narratology methods. The work of realism narratology is to tell “true” narratives, by (1) ripping story from their lived context, (2) dumping stories into “real” organization containers, and (3) using stories to meter and measure organization containers (Fairhurst & Putnam, 1999: 9). The work of structuralism narratology rejected realism narratology of organizations as physical containers by focusing on the arbitrary relation of sign systems (stories) and what gets signified. But, structuralists ended up focused on disembodied form qualities (and typologies of dead form elements) rather than situated issues of story performance contexts. Social construction narratologies critique realist and structuralist approaches for their static focus on form mechanics and formist typology and for ignoring dynamic of individual and social interpretation and construction (see Schwandt, 1994 for a review). Yet, the social constructionists refuse to take a critical look at power and material conditions of power. Poststructuralist narratology does what social construction can not: erases, traces, and otherwise deconstructs story to narrate the differences and embeddedness with materiality. “Il n’y a pas de-hors-texte” is Derrida’s most misinterpreted slogan, and according to Currie (1998: 45) “does not mean there is nothing outside the text as most commentators have taken it. It is closer to ‘There is no outside-text.’” The confusion is that Derrida indicates that outside the text are other texts, but also material conditions of textual production, and text traced into material conditions (i.e. factories, schools, bombs, genocide, and war). As Fairclough’s (1992: 73) three-dimension model of discourse practice (text, in a context of discursive practice, embedded in a context of social practices) demonstrates in his application of Foucault’s archaeology approach to discourse. Critical theory foregrounds the material conditions even more than poststructuralist narratology. It puts story on the rack of the material condition, while itself claiming a teleological history of dialectic materialism (thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis cycles). Postmodern narratology disputes the teleology of historical determinism, technology determinism, and managerialism. And postmodern narratology shatters living story into many disembodied fragments called petit or local stories in the condition of late capitalism. Poststructuralist, postmodern and critical

theory approaches critique realist, structuralist, and social construction narratologies for failing to account for macro socioeconomic contexts in their analyses. It is this interdisciplinary assemblage that I mean by the term “critical postmodern narrative theory.”

Rather, than review these one by one to point out their intra- and inter-differences, and thereby use up all the pages of this chapter, I direct you to work already published (Boje, Alvarez, & Schooling, 1999 and reviews of different arrays by Fairhurst & Putnam, 1999; Currie, 1998). In this chapter I want to focus instead on how critical postmodern narrative theory is splicing elements of various Table One narratologies into moving and overflowing rhizomatic relationships (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The good stuff is in the interconnections between paradigms and the spaces between, not in them.

Rhizomatics inside of Narratology Trees Rhizomatics involves the formations of tubers, tap roots, and nodal links between variegated roots. The rhizome says Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21) is connectivity in motion: “It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (*milieu*) from which it grows and which it overfills.” Whereas a tree of knowledge splits into branches and sub-branches, a rhizome is the melding together of the roots of the tree, connecting any root (in this case narrative paradigm) to any other root (another narratology).

Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 21).

Unlike the tree of narrative positions presented in Table One’s left side, “The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots” (p. 21). The rhizome is movement not static, a “system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 21).

I propose to apply rhizome to narrative, to the intersecting multiplicities of narrative content and to narrative expression, looking, as did Foucault (1979) at the microhistory genealogy of each narrative movement and the disciplinary architecture of power we call the macro structure of narratives. There is an interrupted transmission and an uninterrupted moving connectivity of narrative content and expression across generations of actors and spectators of organizations. I am recruited into the middle of a stream of narrative connections, one line of flight, among the rhizome of organization. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987) content and expression are acts of double articulation. My focus is on the movement of narratives in acts of inter-connection between the micro and macro of narrative. The narrative content is molecular, the narrative expression is molar (differing by scale). Both together are the simultaneity of double articulation.

Table one lists several recent books that have approach what I term *critical postmodern narrative theory* in quite different ways. Lyotard's (1997) *Postmodern Fables* and Bauman's (1997) *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, as examples of the postmodern narrative turn, one that narrates the anxiety of fragmentation, the plurality of life mode choices, and the collapsing (in time and space) global political economy. The narrative turns to spectacles of production and consumption is articulated in film with Dixon's (1998) *The Transparency of Spectacle*. In the narrative turn proposed by Francese (1997) several narrative writers narrate in ways that lead us back from the postmodern fragmentation to late modern. Next is Currie's (1998) *Postmodern Narrative Theory* which I think draws many of the narrative turns together into one audacious work. Currie (1998) favors a socio-narrative approach that takes aspects of structuralist analysis (formism) and combines them with postmodern narrative work (e.g. critical historicism). Iggers' (1997) postmodern historiography is the nexus of micro storytelling at the local level and the macro stories of grander narration that constitute social class and political economy. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) *One Thousand Plateaus* provides numerous analyses. Here I focus on rhizomatics and faciality theories that I see as having postmodern narrative import. Burrell (1997) *Pandemonium* takes a genealogical approach and a critical look at how

organization studies excludes the peasantry in its narrations, including a look at sadomasochism and the relation between modernity and the holocaust (a topic Bauman has also pursued). The various postmodern narrative theory writers posit quite different resolutions to the postmodern condition that merits more review. My contribution to this array is festive narrative theory. In this chapter I situate festive narrative among the critical postmodern narrative theories, a bridging of multiple narratologies, that for me is a way to get at festivalism as living, life and death stories within the postmodern spectacle of late capitalism. There are two things I seek to claim from the reviews that follow, a theory of narrative double logic and an answer to what postmodern narrative theory has to offer to a gentler and kinder capitalism.

Transparency of Spectacles Living within narrative structures, our consumptive fashion choices are mostly spectacular argues Wheeler Winston Dixon. Dixon (1998: 179-180), for example, asserts that each day we select which shirt or blouse, color, or style to wear in order to fashion our identity in the narrative structure of spectacle, to identify which fashion-tribe we belong to. Our clothing is a silent narration of our identity. We narrate in our consumptive choices. We temper our fashion narration with a sense of the political, social, work, or play context we expect to adorn each day. The spectacle socializes our narrative expression into fashionable wear. Dixon (1998: 182) argues that we get socialized in the spectacle of Hollywood cinema, with its “translucence of coalescing narrative structure, signification systems exhausted through ceaseless recycling, and a star system which cannibalizes all who participate in it.”

In cinema, television, and computer, we are bombarded with digitized images that narrate us as spectators into designer spectacles, advertising schemes, and corporate drama. In the midst of a televised baseball, football, and soccer games, digitized images not only scroll across the screen, but the game becomes digitized replays, and there are digitized commercial decompositions of the screen to superimpose this or that corporate logo onto the field of play. This way the same commercial sporting space and time can be sold over and over again. “Thus, viewers of a baseball game in new York might see

an advertisement for Miller Beer behind the batter's box; the same viewer in France might see the Citroen corporate logo in the exact same location" (Dixon, 1998: 184). Coke logos just appear on the field of play, and it can be done with such finesse the spectator does not distinguish it from "real." The next step is here, to digitize and airbrush the rough edging off the dream plays and star players, from archives of instant replay; to hype up the spectacle of continuous consumption (Dixon, 1998: 184). "The present becomes eternal, manipulated by pixels and the whim of a sponsor" (p. 184).

What does the arrival of digital storytelling mean to festival? We replace the mess and sweat of life with digitized narrations for our instant consumption. Festival is too rough and tumble for spectacle commerce. "Our connection to the world has become one of images rather than contacts, of surfaces rather than interior motivations" (Dixon, 1998: 185). We live in the film, called *Matrix*, so unaware of the difference between digitized imaging systems and human existence; we do not bother to resist the digital narrative structures; escape the violence of the existential reality of four billion people living outside airbrushed spectacle. Pop in a video, put on those virtual helmets, or surf the net for spectacle narrative. You can be an active spectator, engaged in cyber sex, or virtual flirtation in the chat rooms, participating in the design of your own image identity, addicted to spectacle illusion and digital consumption. Dixon (1998: 186) ends his book with a provocative question, is spectacle so dangerously seductive, "that we must control, before it controls us." Various postmodern narrative theory writers pose different answers to this question.

Postmodern Time and Space Joseph Francese (1997) takes a different approach. He blames the revolution in information technology on postmodernity and sees a return to late modern narrative as the cure to un-civilization. As the corporation reinvents itself in cyberspace, our work self is also renarrated, we become the digitized knowledge workers, tending the virtual meeting places. To me, he misses the point that modern corporations reengineered through the application of information technology our sensations of time and space; it is an act of late modernity. Corporations own the digitized video technology and cyber

technology. As corporations began making their workforces mobile between the 1950s and 1970s, workers were stripped of any sense of place or tradition. Movable workers allowed corporations to make moves on the global stage. As Jameson (1991) argues, we are no longer governed by cycles of time, we succumb to fashions dreamed up by corporate media. Our time seasons are artificial spectacles.

If we can delegitimize the dominant discourse Francese (1997: 110) argues we can then “reestablish social bonds and strengthen the temporal and spatial points of orientation debilitated by postmodernity.” I find myself agreeing with the move to delegitimize dominant discourse, but preferring to see corporate hegemony as modern, not postmodern. Let us put aside the question of blame, be it modern or postmodern. Francese does offer a narrative project.

There are late modern narratives by Tabucchi, Morrison, and Doctorow that Francese (1997: 107) reviews to oppose the lack of historical depth in postmodern narrative and still reaffirm social bonds and self-awareness. These three writers, he argues, overcome fragmentation and schizophrenia of the postmodern condition. Whereas modern corporate narrating assaults us with enlightenment utopias, vision quest, and techno myth of ascending progress, Francese is after narratives of a different sort.

Morrison, who narrates a chorus of players in objectifying plurivocality, Doctorow who undermines objectivity by blurring the distinction between fiction and nonfiction, and Tabucchi who explores the surrealism of multiple subjectivities. Together they bring historical and choral context to shatter the isolation of the transparent and habituated-present of the postmodern condition by anchoring “objectifying points of reference external to the self” (p. 156).

Late modern writers, such as Doctorow, “the past is structured according [to] the present’s need to create a past in its own image, an image that reflects the present’s evolving self-illusions” as the needs of the present change, so do its images of the past” (Francese, 1997: 132). E. L. Doctorow’s narratives are for Francese (1997: 130) an example of writing with a “multiplicity of witnesses” in a “democracy of perception.” The multi witnessed accounts present a “panoptic

perspective” that is said to guard against “univocal truth” tellings (Francese, 1997: 130). Doctorow is self-aware that his is writing as a witness to spectacle scripted by the dominant classes, aware of isolation shrouded in layers of metafiction: “to breach the barrier modernism has erected between the fate of the individual and that of the collectivity” (Trenner, 1983: 50). His is a late modern critique of spectacle. Doctorow writes with pathos on how society sacrifices moral sensitivity for economic self-interest and materiality. One example is how “Sartorius’s plan to create a breed of immortal posthuman cyborgs contrasts with ‘Christian society’s’.... belief in the immortality of the soul” (Francese, 1997: 133). The characters “Sartorius and Grimshaw compose a God according to what each believes is humanity’s image; their clash is merely between divergent idiosyncratic views of humanity” (p. 133-134). The characters Pemberton and Tweed, “blur all distinctions between legal and illegal ventures” to pervert “the American ideal” by establishing “an economic nobility” in laissez faire capitalism (p. 136). This is the same move we reviewed in Social Darwinian narratives.

Toni Morrison, on the other hand, challenges racial, gender, and class boundaries of African American narration. Morrison’s presents readers with a “village” of voices expressing “community values” (Francese, 1997: 111). She does invite the narrative spectator to recount his or her own stories. “The reader as narrator asks the questions the community asks, and both reader and ‘voice’ stand among the crowd, within it, with the privileged intimacy and contact, but without any more privileged information than the crowd has” (Morrison, in *Unspeakable Things Unspoken*, 29).

Antonio Tabucchi, the third late modernist writer, for Francese (1997: 143) also brings back to present the realities that no longer exist. But the core of Tabucchi’s narrative inquiry is “theorization of multiple subjectivities” (p. 139). In a surrealist introspection of self and other-knowledge, spectators from different times are transported to the present to gaze one another. The late modernist surrealist narrative style allows Tabucchi to reconnect literature and life, something lost to the modernists (p. 143).

Tabucchi narrates “a forgotten past in order to alter the course of the present” (p. 146). He does this with an articulation of multiple and surreal subjectivities. This serves to interrogate the role of writers in the society of the spectacle. Multiple spectators from many times and places undermine univocal narratives of the past. For example, it is harder to present Christopher Columbus as the hero of independence when ghosts of Haiti and Cuba are recalled to the present. It is harder for Nike to go into denial when Asian women factory workers travel to Beaverton, Oregon. We writers and readers are so habituated to the present, the historical context seems out of place, unless it fits a linear trace to now.

Socio-Narratology Mark Currie (1998) calls for a socio-narratology as an example of double logic (see section below). Coming out of the narrative turn, Currie (1998) sees a loss polemic and oppositional narratology that can use formalism and the New Criticism to unmask ideology and hegemony. First, like Giddens, is Currie’s critique of synchronic narration by tracing stories of time told in linear sequence. This is embedding the present in its historicism. And the recognition that there is not one, but many histories (Currie, (1998: 79). It is a questioning of teleology narratives to trace the differences that have been excluded. Second is narrative exclusion. Metaphors and models exclude by a tyranny of sameness. Traces of context reveal absences of political importance, of agents bent to ideology. The focus on pure presence is an exclusion of past and future. A fall from natural existence implies that ecology has some metaphysical priority against which the history of capitalism can be seen as a process of progress or deterioration (p. 83). “Narrative history is often constructed around an opposition between an origin and its supplement, or that which comes later, so that the story is one of loss of innocence or original purity” (p. 83).

Men and boys are socialized to be voyeurs, identifying with the surrogate spectator in the ad (another white male my own age), assuming our narrative gaze position, as male heterosexual, and ogling the erotic image of the

advertised female.¹ In ads and films, for the female, the actress is “framed by the camera as an image, an icon, the object of the male gaze, whose look is relayed by the look of a male character acting as surrogate spectator” (Currie, 1998: 31). He adds “for the female spectator, the pleasure of identification becomes a two-sided process in which the identity positions of looking and being looked at are at war” (p. 32). The postmodern narrative challenge to this process is to disrupt the mainstream positionality, for example, to construct the female gaze of male sexuality, or the gay or bisexual gaze of heterosexual sexuality. Currie (1998) draws together critical theory, poststructuralist, and postmodern narrative theories to focus on the contextualization of storytelling in postmodern culture and political economy. His main focus is on the impact of the new historicism in breaking the barrier between high and popular culture and detotalizing grand narratives of history such as Hitler’s commissioned positivist histories of Aryan race evolution into local narrative studies of identity and into many local histories (p. 107-8). This he calls a “new kind of doubleness: in narrative, on the one hand the story of stories (metanarrative) and the other seeing such grand and totalizing narratives as just another narrative to be analyzed and deconstructed. We will have more to say about double narrative logic in the next section.

Postmodern Fables Jean-Francois Lyotard’s (1997) recent book *Postmodern Fables* is a collection of fifteen short stories of “aesthetic” pleasure, each with a moral to tell. In one of Lyotard’s (1997: 83) short stories, *A Postmodern Fable*, he starts at the ending: at the moment when “the Brain and its Human” leaves the planet “before its destruction” before the Sun exploded and the Earth goes nova. “Humanity at that time, is meticulously preparing spaceships for the exodus” into the cosmos as chaos and entropy do their thing (p. 84). “For a long time (if you count in human time), techniques and collective institutions appeared by chance... communities that were more differentiated than others in political or economic matters were defeated by simpler but more vigorous systems (as had been the case among living species)” (p. 89). In feats

¹ Currie (1998: 31) refers to work by Mulvey on the “surrogate spectator as a narrative position with which the male heterosexual voyeur can easily identify, being hailed into the film to ogle the

of progress, flexible, open systems out performed rigid fixed role hierarchical systems. "In the long run, the open systems won out completely over all the other systems (human, organic, and physical) locked in struggle on the surface of the planet Earth" (p. 90). "It even became necessary that the open systems temper their success over other systems in order to preserve the ensemble called an ecosystem for a catastrophic deregulation" (p. 90). To facilitate space travel, the biotechnology of the human body was remodeled. "What a Human and his/her Brain – or rather the Brain and its Human – would resemble at the moment when they leave the planet forever, before its destruction; that, the story does not say" (p. 91).

Liotard's fable is appears to be a simple, realist narratology of coevolution, a metamorphosis of art and reality in the great exodus of the species Humanity to escape the entropic catastrophic end of our solar system into chaos. "The hero of the fable is not the human species, but energy... It's a tragedy about energy" (p. 92-93). Yet, beyond the realist tale, is a postmodern undecidability. "One of the characteristics of the open systems the fable calls 'liberal democratic' is to leave open certain spaces of uncertainty that are apt to facilitate the appearance of more complex organizations, and this, in every realm" (p. 94). This relates to current obsession in organization studies with chaos and complexity, self-designing systems, and the chance and randomness of coevolution. It is a history of energy told as a fable. "For a fable is an organization of language, and language is a very complex state of energy, a symbolic technical apparatus" (p. 94).

And, what you may ask, has fabulation to do with festival? In the fable, I can imagine the festive reality, tell its story retrospectively and neutralize spectacle performativity, to as Lyotard puts it, cure itself of "the contagion of modernity" with its temporal (Enlightenment with progress) and spatial (Globalization with singularity) narrative devices (p. 96-97). The moral of the postmodern fable seeks to avoid modern historicity in four ways.

erotic image of a female character."

First, it is a physical history with energy as its hero, not humanity. Humankind is a complex material system, conscious of the material effects of its language. Second, time is put into play in this fable of a history of energy, as a diachronic succession of physical movements. Third, the end of this history is not emancipation, except in the rescue of the “super-brain,” it is “the result of a cybernetic loop regulated toward growth” (p. 99). Fourth, the fable recounts the final perfection of a Brain material that is “dependent on the conditions of terrestrial life” (p. 99). It is not about hope. “The formation called Human or Brain will have been nothing more than an episode in the conflict between differentiation and entropy” (p. 99). The Human mutates to sustain higher performing systems. “Humans are very mistaken in their presuming to be the motors of development and in confusing development with the progress of consciousness and civilization” (p. 99). Violence and not violence are simply the works of complex adaptive systems.

Why is Lyotard (1997) now doing the thing Lyotard (1984) protests, invoking a modernist grand narrative? “It does not respond to the demand for remission and emancipation” (1997: 100). The fable is not a remedy of the postmodern condition; it is an explanation of it. This postmodern fable has no awareness of good and evil. The fable is possessed of realist content. “The content, the meaning of what it is talking about, signifies the end of hopes (modernity’s hell). The *form* of the narrative inscribes this content onto the narrative itself, reducing it in class to that of mere fable” (p. 100). It is imaginary, not critical discourse of the crisis of modernity in the postmodern condition. It is aesthetic and pessimistic, rather than pretending to ethical or political narration. “Man is not the center of the universe” a point made by Galileo, Darwin, Freud and now Lyotard (p. 101). In the postmodern condition, man “is not the master of discourse” (p. 101).

In other fables, Lyotard (1997) is giving commentary on spectacle. In the spectacle we dress out our identity, our sex, social class, generation, and ethnicity by choosing among the artifices in the marketplace of cultural capitalism. “What cultural capitalism has found is the marketplace of singularities.

May we all express our singularity?" (Lyotard, 1997: 7). We can eat twenty-one meals a week, each from a different country's cuisine, sampling the global cultural stream of snacks, all suitable for microwave. We can take a weekend tour of the Seven Wonders of the World. We can surf 150 channels, recording what we are missing on several VCRs. "Even its violence, wars, revolts, riots, ecological disasters, famines, genocides, murders are broadcast as spectacles, along with the following notice: you see, this is not good, it requires new regulations, other forms of community that must be invented, this will pass" (Lyotard, 1997: 31). You are shopping, Through many strategies of exploitation the local Wal-Mart has assembled the largest public display, a spectacle of consumables in climate-controlled aesthetics, thrilling goods made cheaply by people speaking in every Third World language. What could be more spectacular?

It's only interesting as spectacle. That's what the interest of dynamics is, not force or power, but the aesthetic pleasure they procure. A human community who contemplates its differences. A generalized aesthetics. The great operation of our fin de siecle, of the turn of the century perhaps (Lyotard, 1997: 11).

Spectacle narration turns the tragedies of child labor, surveillance, animal slaughter factories, genocide, ecological destruction, and corporate imperialism into the romantic stories of learning, knowledge, and cyber work. Lyotard focuses on the tragedy of the isolation. Spectacle narratives denature us from time, place, and spirit.

Postmodern Fragments and Discontents Zygmunt Bauman (1997: 168) book is relevant to my own project of relating spectacle to the spirituality of Ahimsa. He points out that religiosity and spirituality offers "ontological security" whereas the postmodern condition is one of "existential anxiety." What is postmodern existential anxiety?

The growing willingness to admit that not only is Being underpinned by Chaos and Absurdity rather than preordained Order and Meaning, but it is going to stay that way for the duration, and nothing we can do will change it (Bauman, 1997: 23).

Lyotard's fable of the world coming to its entropic end as the mutated Brain leaves on its missile expresses the latter. The former is expressed in the daily "mortification: the renunciation of life in this world, what Foucault calls "a death which is supposed to provide life in another world" (cited in Bauman, 1997: 169). The other makes energy systems the hero, as humankind is cast as bit player. Spectacle argues Debord (1967: #59) following Marx, is its own religiosity.

Under the shimmering diversions of the spectacle, banalization dominates modern society the world over and at every point where the developed consumption of commodities has seemingly multiplied the roles and objects to choose from. The remains of religion and of the family (the principal relic of the heritage of class power) and the moral repression they assure, merge whenever the enjoyment of this world is affirmed--this world being nothing other than repressive pseudo-enjoyment. The smug acceptance of what exists can also merge with purely spectacular rebellion; this reflects the simple fact that dissatisfaction itself became a commodity as soon as economic abundance could extend production to the processing of such raw materials.

As modern spectacle absorbed religion, "*the sole things that matter to humans are the things humans may take care of*" (Bauman, 1997: 170, italics in original). In the romantic ideology of corporate adventurer, the hero of modernity is the "parvenu," a nomad who is "already *in*, but not quite *of*, place; an aspiring resident without a residence permit" (Bauman, 1997: 72). Nomadic knightly CEOs do battle with other knights over residence, labor and workhouse permits in China, and other places. The habits of the knight-errant die-hard (Nerlich, 1987). The church and crown are once again seeking to tame the returning knights from their crusades to the civil life of courtly conduct, this time with new age spiritual meditations. Nike, for example, keeps its wanderers' impulse as a nomadic tourist taking up temporary residence wherever cheaper labor is to be found. Its narrative is remaking the world in Nike's image" (Bauman, 1997: 91). And activists seek to tame the knight-Nike with civilized codes of knightly conduct and humane spirituality. Nike pins its narratives so as to deceive even itself to believe its narrative of progress and economic liberation; "Just Do It" is the savior of the Third World.

Spirituality in this New Age is the act of each individual seeking abundance in daily life, transplanting existential compass tools from many world religions while seeking to transcend religiosity. The universe will provide happiness and freedom as we tune into the spirit within. The universe, the world, and humankind is alive with spirituality. And again, humankind is at the center of this spiritual universe, able to become whatever thought desires. Spiritualism is a variant of the postmodern nemesis, humanism.

Humanism was not so much about being able to become whatever one may will, as about willing to become what one truly can (given the ample, though not necessarily infinite, richness of human potential): willing only those things that one can do something concrete and practical about making true... The idea of human self-sufficiency undermined the grip of institutionalized religion not by promising an alternative way to eternal life, but by drawing human attention away from it; by focusing instead on tasks which humans may perform and whose consequences they are able to experience as long as they are still 'experiencing beings' – and this means here, in this life (Bauman, 1997: 172).

Religiosity is either giving way to spirituality or just reinventing itself. And it is a movement that is making inroads into the Academy and the Business College. And without a revolution spectacle is perfectly accommodating, changing its religiosity of production and consumption, into profitable spirituality, into a new work and leisure commodity ethic. There is a cacophony of books on spirituality and business practice with titles like: *Think and Grow Rich*, *The Power of Positive Thinking*, *Seven Spiritual Laws of Leadership*, *Leading with Soul*, *Managing with the Wisdom of Love*.

When the overarching goals of the organization is only profit and the increase of shareholder wealth, it is difficult to create a spiritual framework, for as soon as the bottom line is threatened, love goes out the window as an expendable commodity (Marcic, 1997: 21).

The new asceticism of spirituality and business is all the rage. Conferences at the International Academy of Business Disciplines and Organizational Behavior Teaching Conference are booking spirituality tracks. The main Academy confines it pre-conference workshops and occasional paper sessions in orthodox tracks, a

part of the regular spectacle. There is considerable fascination with the new late modern and New Age postmodern genres of business practice. It portends the promise of reenchanting mechanical organization with organic spirituality, the *living organization* is being given a corporate soul, and a moral compass. Spirituality experts are available to help one narrate their work life as a spirituality story, the new ontology of corporate existence. The ontological uncertainty of modern organization is thus resolvable in spirituality consultation. It is the age of the “spirituality counseling boom.” As Bauman observes (1997: 178)

Postmodernity is the era of experts in ‘identity problems,’ of personality healers, of marriage guides, of writers of ‘how to reassert yourself’ books; it is the era of the ‘counseling boom.’” Business executives need spiritual counseling and their organizations need spiritual healing. “Uncertainty postmodern-style begets not the demand for religion; it gestates instead the ever rising demand for identity-experts (p. 179).

The business list serves are buzzing: “how many business colleges have one or more spirituality courses in their curriculum?” I serve on three spirituality dissertations. There will be more. In the new spirituality narratives executives are saints, hermits, mystics, ascetic monks, or given to the dark side. In critical theory, corporations are predators, organized around the gratification and peak experiences of production and consumption, or headed for articulations of spiritual awareness of humanity and ecology, while playing the game by the same rules. Executives and corporations are now competing to be more spiritually spectacular, more thrilling, exotic, and sublime than their competitors. TQM is out, and spirituality retreats are on the rise.

Is spiritual organization a new fundamentalism, one somehow different from the religions of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Jainism, etc? Is it an escape to premodern native religions and spiritual practices? If spiritual organization counseling and training is not a premodern escape or the old fundamentalism of old time religion, what is it? Bauman (1997: 182) argues it is “having one’s cake and eat it.” It is the legitimation of modern technological development in spirituality. It is the new fundamentalism cosmology of late

capitalism in the postmodern condition. It is the new legitimation of the cures to the Biotech Century (Rifkin, 1997). It is the blind faith in cyber capitalism to resolve the ills of global economy. The poor are just “flawed consumers” and organizations are flawed producers (Bauman, 1997: 183).

The anecdote to postmodern malaise, disenchantment, and estrangement is the spiritual business movement. Spiritual “fundamentalism brings into the open the underground anxiety and premonition normal and well-nigh universal under the postmodern condition” (p. 183-184). Organizational spirituality is one trend in postmodern culture, the “legitimate child of postmodernity, born of its joys and torments, and heir to its achievements and worries alike” (p. 184). Spiritual “fundamentalism is a radical remedy against the bane of postmodern/market-led/consumer society – risk-contaminated freedom (a remedy that heals the infection by amputating the infected organ – abolishing freedom as such, in as far as there is no freedom free of risks)(Bauman, 1997: 184). Spirituality is a postmodern and fundamentalist response to postmodern fears of privatization, downsizing, deregulated market forces, temporary employment, a world where labor has no safety net and consumers worship at the alter of image consumption. Instead of an escape to pre-modern feudalism, spiritual fundamentalism, argues Bauman, is an “alternative rationality: to the “genuine problems besetting the members of postmodern society” (p. 185). If free market materialism and self-seeking rationality can be subordinated to spirituality, then the miseries of the society of the spectacle has what Adam Smith desired, the moral compassion of the spectator:

The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and judgment (Smith, Part VII).

Both Bauman and Smith recognized the poverty of those excluded from the feast of consumption, as the singular pursuit of materiality widens the gap between rich and poor. Smith’s impartial spectator was to be the invisible gaze of moral sentiment, in the midst of market forces that brutalize the peasantry.

Spirituality was the servant of capitalism in Social Darwinism, preaching the rich were chosen by the hand of God to survive because they were fit for prosperity. The poor could therefore be properly excluded from the festive feast of consumption. The postmodern spirituality movement is hopefully a different moral compass. Possibly one in which the festive feast is open to all, and where an over-feast of the few, does not impoverish and starve the billions. It is this issue which apart from the simplicity and ecology movements to consume less, does not reach the agenda of spiritual fundamentalism in business counseling and curriculum.

Postmodern Macro and Microstoria Georg Iggers (1997) seeks to suspend macro and microstoria in double logic. “At the center of microhistorical investigations stand men and women who have been neglected in the traditional sources” of macrohistory (Iggers, 1997: 114). Unlike Lyotard (1984) who rejects grand narratives, Iggers (1997) favors the micro story (microstoria) practitioners, who while skeptical of the grand narrative, also seek to supplement the macro-story with many different and contrary local stories? Similar to Foucault (1975), microstoria researchers “seek to show how ‘hegemonic institutions have excluded certain ways of thinking as demonic, irrational, heretical, or criminal’” (Iggers, 1997: 109). Hegemony here, is the unnoticed ways of privileging of one logic, story, or discourse over another. Whereas the postmodernist Lyotard (1984) rejects all grand narratives (macro stories and narratives), Igor looks at the simultaneity of micro and macro stories. People draw upon macro stories (e.g. political economy, evolution, technological progress, national sovereignty) to initiate and actively constitute their micro stories in acts of resistance, and vice versa.

Pandemonium Gibson Burrell’s (1997) book is postmodern in several ways. The writing and layout of the text is postmodern writing. The introduction invites you to read just the top part of the pages to the end of the book, then return to the front by reading only the bottom half of the page. Here and there Burrell draws lines between the top and bottom half circling various phrases that seem to have something to do with one another. Burrell (1997) is also postmodern in

his application of Foucault's genealogy method. Burrell seeks to find out why parts of history are left out of organization theory. He reclaims these in a retro-theory of organization. Finally, Burrell's book is postmodern in the same way that Dollimore (1998) and Linstead (1999) looks at the darkest sides of the postmodern condition. And, this book I write has also been a look into the abyss of violence that saturates the society of the spectacle. These dark side works, look at the terrain of violence, mutability, and desire that is excluded by modern organization theory and at the abyss that escapes more affirmative postmodern positions. "Devotees of post-modern theory" says Dollimore (1998: xxiii) are "often ignorant of intellectual history, remain unaware of the extent to which earlier ways of thinking which it claims to have entirely superseded remain obscurely active within it." Dollimore (1998) and Linstead (1999), for example, both point to the medieval and early modern work of Georges Bataille (1897-1962). "Life is nothing but instability and disequilibrium... a swelling tumult continuously on the verge of explosion" (from *Erotism*, pp. 59-60, as cited in Dollimore, 1998: 249). Another example is Nietzsche who embraced the dark side of chaos, flux, and change before chaos theory was an utterance. Linstead (1999) remarks in Dollimore's violent abyss of language, torture, death, and desire, "what must we do to sustain our humanness?"

Storytelling Organization Theory This was reviewed in the last chapter. In summary, I view stories as weaving and moving to network multiple conversation and simultaneous story stage contexts, making the organization as a whole, a storytelling organization. The work of the story weaving and movement is to restory stories from collective memory into the living present providing both rationalization and legitimation. The storytelling organization gives spectacle account of its action in transorganization contexts of other organizations (Boje, 1991a,b; 1995; 1999b; Boje, Luhman & Baack, 1999; Boje & Wolf, 1991). In these various approaches stories have a living circulation weaving together micro and macro contexts of storytelling and organizing in ways that are not centrally discussed in the various independent uni-discipline narratologies.

Ahimsa and Festive Narration Seeing the circulation of stories in the material condition of late capitalism, I seek to hold organizations accountable to less violent practices. In Ahimsa, I seek life-affirming principles where all sentient life (human, plant, animal) is respected. Simplicity is to live in self-restraint, to seek not to squander or destroy life in needless acts of production and consumption.

Predatory capitalism is a consumption of the natural world, an annihilation of life itself. Sustainable ecology sets out prohibitions to reduce, reuse, and recycle, but not at a pace fast enough to stem the tide of spectacle extinction of nature and the substitution of simulated environment (state Parks, Disney, Malls with trees, suburban landscaping) for natural. The spectacle desire to consume nature is conflicted with the desire to humanness and these two with the desire to be an ecocentric being with a respect for all life, not just human life. Yet, to the meat eater there is nothing more repulsive and distasteful as the vegetarian, to the logger it is the ecologist on a mission to save trees, to the furrier it is the animal rights activist, and to civilization it is the native that must be cleansed and exterminated. Spectacle is attracted to consume that life that festival celebrates, and festival has a desire to embrace the death marketed in spectacle erotica. A civilized sexy model exhibiting Nike shoes, Minks, and Guess jeans masks the uncivilized labor and animal slaughterhouse practices by which these garments are made. To me, the festival narrative tells the living story of the material conditions of labor and animal production that spectacle does not display in its ads and store displays.

We live our festive story in the presence of our violent spectacle abyss of multiple intersecting deconstructions and destructions. From Bataille and Nietzsche I learn that spectacle is half of a dualism, the desire for annihilation in violent theatrics and narrative, while the other side of the dualism is festival life-affirming being. Can we abandon the death/life dualism and resituate it as death and life? Spectacle is a disavowal of its violent consumption and production in a material world of finite earth resources, half its human population living as peasantariat while a few possess most of the wealth and resources in acts of

spectacular over-consumption. Debord (1967) saw in capitalism this anti-life principle and sought the other side of the duality, the situation of life affirmation, what I have been calling festival.

In each of the critical and postmodern narrative theory texts, the theme seems to be how to rein in the postmodern condition of fragmentation and alienation. Deleuze and Guattari appeal to rhizomatics in a thousand analysis of the schizophrenics of capitalism (see next chapter for demonstrations). Dixon seeks caution in our acceptance of spectacle narration. For Francese it is a return to late modern re-inscriptions of voice and histories into the present. Bauman is skeptical of the new age postmodern moves to invoke spiritual and religious fundamentalism in a search for universal and essential values. Iggers connects the microstoria work of the Italians to the grand narratives, noting special acts of resistance, one to the other. Currie seeks to reunite postmodern narrative with formist and structuralist narratologies. Lyotard's fable seeks to decenter humans as the hero of the story of the world invoked in chaos does. Burrell says lets descend into the abyss of violence, to look open-eyed at the relation of modernity to violence. My own critical postmodern theories of storytelling organizations situate local narratives in juxtaposition to grander stories of organization and political economy. In sum, postmodern narratology is a contested terrain, with little or no agreement on how to situate narrating in the material conditions of the postmodern condition. To me, the path lies in reclaiming living story from the clutches of both spectacle and the narratologies of Table One.

Stories with a Critical "Double Logic" Life of their Own In picking my living story theorists in Table One, I have privileged a return to native storytelling, a respect for living within nature (though we can find examples where this was not always and in every instance the case). Yet Derrida (1988) also has a view that "texts have life beyond the situations that produced them" (Fairhurst & Putnam, 1999: 10). This is akin to the view of living story theorists (TwoTrees, 1997; Toelken, 1996; Clair, 1997) that stories possess a mind of their own. It also relates to Taylor and colleagues equivalency theory of communicating texts

in conversations and organizing within micro-moments and transorganizational contexts. And, the living story theory relates to my own work in critical postmodern storytelling. Living story involves us in double logics.

I do not mean capitalism/festivalism as a duality, but as what Derrida calls double logic. Adam Smith wrote *Moral Sentiments* while he wrote editions of *The Wealth of Nations*. Our extensions to Guy Debord's *Society of the Spectacle* seek a way to move to spectacle self-awareness, to what I am calling festivalism. We shall explore how life and death are two sides of the capital and festive coin, not as head and tails, but as a power struggle between the wish to die and the desire to live. Festive narration is the power of story to create visions of nonviolence sensitizing us producers and consumers to hidden acts of violence beneath the façade of spectacle. Festivalism does not put a happy face over the abyss. Festive narration makes violence visible and accountable by showing and telling the life and death coevolving interactions of capital, labor, technology, ecology, and consumption. Festivalism illuminates acts of life and death in capitalism. Spectacle imitates festival. Festivalism and capitalism interpenetrate one another.

Festivalism and capitalism is I shall argue a double logic. Spectacle, for example, is mimetic to festival, as in the example of the Renaissance Festival, and ways in which weddings, conferences, and fast food are made to seem Elizabethan or Arthurian. Spectacle is not a totality it is riddled with festival enactments; here and there capitalism creates life. One interpenetrates the other in a web without a weaver, or so many weavers who can sort out its practices, and so many fragments it is easy to pretend we are not complicit in the slaughterhouses we have reviewed in preceding chapters.

Double Logic of Narrative and Story Jonathan Culler (1981: 169) observes a hierarchy and indeterminacy between narratology and storytelling he must deconstruct. Reviewing the structuralist traditions of Russian Formalists (Propp & Shklovsky) American structuralism (James, Lubbock, Booth, & Chatman), and French Structuralists (Barthes, Todorov, Bremond, Greimas, Pavel, & Prince) he spies the duality of narrative and story. Culler (1981: 169)

notes: “if these theorists agree on anything it is this: that the theory of narrative requires a distinction between what I shall call ‘story’ – a sequence of actions or events, conceived as independent of their manifestation in discourse – and what I shall call ‘discourse,’ the discursive presentation or narration of events.” Culler (1981, 1982) emphasizes the impossibility of a synthesis of story and narrative discourse because of the effect of self-deconstruction. “A deconstruction involves the demonstration that a hierarchical opposition, in which one term is said to be dependent upon another conceived as prior, is in fact a rhetorical or metaphysical imposition and that the hierarchy could well be reversed” (1982: 183).

The story merely recites the “true” chronological order of succession of temporal events, noting spatial location, and relation of characters who cause or undergo events (paraphrasing Mieke Bal in Culler, 1981: 171). The reality of the story is then interpreted by narrative structure, noting significant characters, plot structure, and fateful climax. Story is conceived as independent of and prior to narrative structure discourse in structuralist narratology.

This sets up a temporal hierarchy. “Positing the priority of events to the discourse which reports or presents them, narratology establishes a hierarchy which the functioning of narratives often subverts by presenting events not as givens but as the products of discursive forces or requirements” (Culler, 1981: 172). Prior events, even unreported events (as in who done it murder novels), determine the meaning in subsequent events by the demand of narrative coherence. The sequence, A, C, D, E, is missing a B-event that must have happened.

An example of Double Logic: “Oedipus becomes the murderer of his father not by a violent act that is brought to light but by bowing to the demands of narrative coherence and deeming the act to have taken place”(Culler, 1981: 174). “Oedipus’s guilt or innocence has already been determined by a past event that has not yet been revealed or reported” (p. 175). The tragic plot gives this unseen event causal import, and Oedipus concedes to narrative coherence, to declare his own guilt. But, only after denying that various evidence must mean he murdered his father. It could have been coincidence. The undecidability which

logic is true gives the play its tragic rendering. It is the double logic, “presenting its plot as a sequence of events which is prior to and independent of the given perspective on these events, and, at the same time, suggesting by its implicit claims to significance that these events are justified by their appropriateness to the thematic structure” (p. 178).

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Structuration Theory and Double Articulation Double articulation is consistent with Anthony Giddens’s (1979, 1984) theory of structuration. Structure is both the medium of micro action and the outcome of macro action. “Structuration theory is a general theory aiming to explore the interaction between social structure and human agency” (Baert, 1998: 94). Giddens’ structuration theory and Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics theory both overcome a dualism (split) between actor-oriented and structure-oriented approaches, that I seek to apply to narrative organization. Giddens integrates elements of social construction (Schutz’s social phenomenology), poststructuralism (Derrida’s focus on texts), and structuralism (Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle and Saussure’s distinction of speech and language), to name a few. Double logic, to me, resolves a problem in narrative research (getting beyond the functions of narratives in an organization form and the analysis of forms of narratives without contextual appreciation). It is a move away from static realist and structuralist narratologies to the movements of rhizomatic interconnectivity. As reviewed above, double logic can also be seen in the work of Georg Iggers (1997) to bridge micro and macro storytelling.

These varied approaches by Giddens, Currie, Derrida, Culler, Iggers, Deleuze & Guattari look at two simultaneous narrative logics. In the first logic, realism, structuralism, and social construction narrative approaches do not focus on power or politics, favoring instead functionalism, consensus, and structure. In

the second logic, poststructuralism, critical theory, and postmodern narratologies focus on power and politics. A double logic would look at both logics and their interconnectivity. Whereas the first logic narratives look at static snap shots of time to assess form, function and structure (parts integrated into wholes), the second logic narrative disciplines focus on unfolding and moving narrative constructions (wholes flying apart into lines of flight), on the verb organizing, as opposed to the noun of organization. The first logic is synchronic (social structure, form, function and order at one time shot), whereas the second is diachronic (social change, evolution, discontinuity, fragmentation, flight, movement over time). Realist and structuralist narratologies do not address how organizations are produced, constructed, and reconstructed through time by social actors. Social construction addresses this issue, but not the power and politics of organizing. Social construction, evolution, and adaptation look at “adaptation” as a mechanism of change that the double logic theorists (Derrida, Giddens, Deleuze and Guattari) find vague.

Giddens for example tries to take the vagueness out of adaptation in evolution theory. Giddens does this by noting diffuse features that I will apply to organization and narrative:

1. **Adaptation.** This is the mechanism used to explain the transition from one stage in the sequence of evolution to the next. There is a reduction here by not looking at the diffuse mechanisms that follow, including ignoring human agency in making purposive choices.
2. **Narrative Analogy.** There is a narrative analogy between social and biological evolution as a sequence of stages throughout history that is applicable to all societies and to all organizations. Again agency is ignored.
3. **Unilinear Compression.** The belief that statements or narratives about development sequence and developments in a few societies can be generalized to all societies.
4. **Homological Compression.** This narrative plots a structural identity or equivalency between individual and societal or organization stages of development. For example early stages of an oral culture are seen as low in psychological complexity compared to advanced stages of that complexity in so-called “civilizations.” Giddens see complexity in both oral and “civil” society.
5. **Normative Illusion.** Economic adaptation is seen as morally superior to other forms of adaptation and regulation. Self-steering, self-

organizing markets are an example. It also assumes that economic adaptation is accomplished without political agency.

6. **Temporal Distortion.** This is a confusion of history (measured time in an unfolding historical narrative) and historicity (time constitutes being in many diffuse local narratives) in ways that reduce the lapse of time to change. Time in structuration theory implies the local agency production and also the macro construction of order (Giddens, 1984: 229-233). There are several time levels, from the micro day-to-day experience structures of human agency to seemingly invariant macro structures enduring over longer time periods resistant to human agency.

Giddens' structuration theory overcomes the duality of micro and macro narrative by looking at human agency in the continuous flow of conduct in a world of structurations in each of these six complications to adaptation. Deleuze and Guattari overcome the duality by looking at lines of flight in rhizomatic structures of moving connectivity. I will apply this double logic to Nike narrative.

Concluding the Story

Festivalism returns life control to humanity. Does this mean a retreat from digitized narrative, from channel surfing, and virtual reality? I type on this computer, with the words materializing on my screen surface, and I can not imagine going back to pencil and paper. I am captured in digitized narration. I can not embed a stylus into paper texture, leaving an imprint that can not be re-imprinted. I have been socialized to accept my narrative role as the reality of my existence in the spectacle of popular culture.

Enough, I think we must coevolve technology, planet, humanity, animality to a new kind of spectacularity, into festivalism. Can I refamiliarize with my social, historical, political, and human being? Was I ever familiar? "To satisfy us, the spectacle must engulf us, threaten us, sweep us up from the first" (Dixon 1998: 7). In comparison to spectacle narrative, festival is said to be too boring, not as real as DVD television images and not as authentic as star performances. What is at stake is our festive right to self-create our self-representation according to our own narrative structure; rather than one that is centrally fashioned by corporate hegemony. In festivalism, we reclaim our personal and collective

narrative space and our natured relationship in time and place. We enter festivalism to escape the surveillance of spectacle managers and social engineers with their death wish.

I observe my self as a partial spectator of my own narrative of narrative theories. I am partial spectator because I am embedded in so many other discourses. I am too often just a passive and partial spectator, a voyeur. I am not an impartial spectator because I can not write without reference to other texts, other authors and other voices. I am a postmodern writer responding to texts of other writers. My festival is my ability here and there to narrate in my own voice. My festival narrative is in my own voice speaking from my heart. My spectacle narrative is in a disembodied voice I have been taught, no indoctrinated to speak.

I observe my self-writing in response to Martin Parker's call that I stare into the Nietzschean abyss. I observe myself becoming the voice of labor, a Marxian voice critical of the labor process, denouncing management discourses. I keep saying love the manager, but hate the managerialist discourse. Love the consumer, but hate the discourse of over-consumption. Why? Because the violence that managers and consumers do is because they are disembodied spectators, partial spectators like me.

Narrative approaches disembody storytelling from its human being-ness in the world of time and place. When we know another as a flesh and blood human being they are embodied. And when we know animals as sentient beings that want to be alive, we are not able to dissect them. Narratologies also put stories onto the analysis table, dissecting their skeletal forms, classifying their elements against other storied elements. These structuralist approaches to narrative are being supplanted by poststructural, postmodern, and critical approaches. However, here too, the story is put through the gaze of deconstructive, reconstructive, and historical materialism. It seems to me that in order to attain festival situations, alternative approaches to narrative must be explored.

Disembodiment has practical import. When the students at Columbine High School set about blowing up their school, shooting and bombing their teachers and class mates, they took a disembodied stance. This disembodiment

began gradually as they found support for their values in Internet chat rooms and sites that promoted bombing as a way to solve problems. Violence is always about disembodiment, inflicting violence on the body. Irony of ironies, as President Clinton condemns a society saturated in violence for nurturing youth to commit acts of bombing, the nation watches as its military pilots smart bombs in disembodied shots of buildings being blown up. We do not want kids to blow up schools, but we blow up buildings in other countries to solve problems.

We narrate in a myriad of discourses. The discourses are fragmented. We are so immersed in crap, in more conspicuous acts of consumption that we can not easily find our way to simplicity. There is too much stuff in our lives. We are on spectacle overload.