It is Time to Set Story Free from Narrative Prison!

© David M. Boje

New Mexico State University dboje@nmsu.edu

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Figure I.2: Types of Story/Narrative Sensemaking

1 Presentation is based on forthcoming book: Storytelling Organization (London: Sage)

FULL TEXT IS AT http://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/690/book
ESCAPING NARRATIVE PRISON

We are deprived of the mystery when story is confined to Aristotle’s (350 BCE) poetic cage. The cage is a prison with seven bars wedged in concrete:

1. Bar 1: Narrative requires story to be coherent. Life, however, is mysterious, with incoherence.
2. Bar 2: Narrative is linear sequence, chronology of beginning, middle, and end imposed on story. In real life story is partially (tersely) told, more out of control.
3. Bar 3: Narrative privileges oral story over written (& visual), making oral originary in Western metaphysics (this Bakhtin overturns with dialogicality, and Derrida with deconstructive supplementarity).
4. Bar 4: Narrative is fixated on one stage, rather than epic story with simultaneity of stages, more incidents and characters, enrolling the public as actors.
5. Bar 5: Narrative is obsessed with wholeness, whereas story is unfinished, unmerged, and never-ending mystery.
6. Bar 6: Narrative is elite; story is what “folk” do, but point of fact, people story more than narrate, even the elite.
7. Bar 7: Narrative treats story as object, what Pondy and I called, “in-place metering device” to assess some abstract reification, such as culture, or the newest rage, tacit-knowledge (Pondy & Boje, 1980).

I sorted the Figure I.1 (above) and Table I.1 (below) scholarly definitions of story/narrative used in business and management into five classifications, along with their more ancient ancestry (such as Aristotle or Kant).

S1: RETROSPECTIVE WHOLES - Qualitative inquiry in the business and management field is dominated by study of stories defined as retrospective wholes. Most often story is defined as Weickian retrospective sensemaking, a “whole,” “proper,” and “coherent” narrative with causally ordered sequencing of events. Most scholars have misread Karl Weick’s (1995) seminal work on retrospective sensemaking theory as being about story variety-making complexity, when in fact it is about using inductive narrative coherence for managerial control. The general misreading of sensemaking is somewhat understandable as Weick uses the terms story and narrative interchangeably, and has other ways of sensemaking (such as enactment). Weick’s retrospective narration is defined as “propensity for inductive generalization [of] noteworthy experiences” that becomes an “empirical basis” where “people try to make the unexpected, hence manageable” (p. 127). Weick’s approach is Aristotelian:
Narrative requires "imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude... Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end" the definition of coherent narrative (Aristotle, 350 BCE: 1450b: 25, p. 233).

Since Aristotle (350 BCE), finalized narrative retrospection has been a prison for what I will call unfinalized story varietymaking. Aristotle imposed narrative-coherence of beginning, middle, and end finality as the only proper story form. Finalized retrospective narrative is a cage so maniacal that researchers relying on narratology or folkloristics do not know much about story or storytelling behaviors, and much less about storytelling organization dynamics, going on outside the narrative prison in ways that are antecedent to sensemaking developmental narrative. Czarniawska (1997: 78, 1998: vii, 2, 63), Gabriel (2000: 5, 19-21, 239), Martin et al (1982: 255; Martin, Feldman, Hatch & Sitkin, 1983: 439), and Weick (1995: 127-129) walk in Aristotle’s shadow. The particular definitions are presented in Table I.1.

S⊗: HERE-AND-NOW - Gertrude Stein (1931, 1935, 1938) was first to break with narrative in looking at here-and-now, and the unfolding present, at diverse landscape of telling. Qualitative inquiry in the business and management field has few studies that inquire into “here-and-now” ways of telling that are very telling. S⊗ is both antecedent and a priori storytelling. S⊗ is a middle ground in between the other ways of sensemaking. Gertrude Stein’s (1931, 1935, 1998) work rejects development sequence retrospection and obsession with coherence. Her focus in a series of three lectures on narrative to University of Chicago (1935) instead is on ways of telling in the moment anticipates antenarrative and dialogic work in S4, but is somehow different. Stein argues, “Anybody can stop listening to any telling of anything” (Stein, Narration, Lecture 3, 1998: 340). Many ways of telling and listening to someone or something are telling (Stein, 1998: 342); “There are many ways to tell what we tell” (Stein, 1998: 340). She asks, “What is the use of telling a story since there are so many and everybody knows and tells so many… So naturally what I wanted to do in my plays was what everybody did not always know or always tell” (Stein, 1931: 40). Stein wrote over 70 plays developed her move away from what she called lust for cohesion.

S2: RETROSPECTIVE PARTS - Story also escapes Aristotle’s narrative prison when you realize story is not some whole text that is agreed-upon, told from beginning to
end, as has been theorized in narrative research. Rather, a story released from narrative prison is dynamic, varies by context, can be quite a *terse* expression, where the hearer fills in blanks and silences with chunks of story line, context, and implication; or can be antecedent, even subterranean. My early work (Boje, 1991, 1995) is more about S2 than S1. S2 is the struggle of (S1) official retrospective narratives of managerial control with counterstories, ones marginalized in official storytelling. It is what Bakhtin (1981) refers to as polyphonic dialogicality (which I abbreviated to dialogism). In what I call “*storytelling organization,*** stories and narratives are being challenged, reinterpreted, and revised by participants as they unfold in conversations. Collective storytelling occurs in which the performance of terse stories is key to not only retrospective sensemaking, but also antecedent sensemaking (enactment), an antecedent varietymaking (multi-discursive). *Storytelling organization* constitute tellers and listeners who become co-tellers and co-listeners, supplementing individual memories with institutional memory retrospection and categories antecedent to experience, such as internalized transcendental conceptions of space and time. I have this ongoing debate with two organization folklore narrativists: Yannis Gabriel and Barbara Czarniawska. Like Gabriel, Czarniawska initially privileged the folkloric and narratology position, setting narrative-plot-cohesion over story; “A story consists of a plot comprising causally related episodes that culminate in a solution to a problem” (Czarniawska, 1997: 78); elsewhere, “For them to become a narrative, they require a plot, that is, some way to bring them into a meaningful whole” (1998: 2). Gabriel (2000: 19-21) says my tersely told “you know the story” (Boje, 1991) is a “narrative deskilling,” not a “proper” story, with plot, preventing full collections being built in management, as they are in his version of “organization folklore.” I say “his version” because, I too study story from “organization folklore,” but instead of story collecting, I observe dialogic story varietymaking behaviors *in situ* in organizing contexts. Gabriel (2000:20) charges that I lost something in my dialogic inquiry (Boje, 1991) by concluding story is mostly tersely-coded, fragmented, and emergent co-constructed varietymaking phenomenon in organizations. Czarniawska (2004: 38) changes from her earlier S1 definitions of narrative, to look at the kinds of interrupted and unfinalized acts of narration that are rampant in complex organizations. Czarniawska relaxed her “proper story” restriction that story submit to narrative-plot; she admits a
wider variety of forms, and summarizes my 1991 study differently than Gabriel; “Boje” found “storytelling in contemporary organizations hardly follows the traditional pattern of a narrator telling a story from the beginning to end in front of an enchanted and attentive audience” (Czarniawska, 2004: 38); yet she still looks at story as only “narrative performance.” Czarniawska’s (2004: 38) did develop the idea of “petrified story,” a reaction to an accusation that my colleagues I made that narrative researchers were apt to treat stories as found artifacts; she put it this way “… every narrative becomes new with each retelling, and the ‘petrification’ of stories is not the result of the myopia of the researcher but of intense stabilizing work by the narrators” in organizations.” I still contend that while there are a few stories that narrativity petrifies, these are rare, and one is well advised to also be studying the more “improper” less linear stories, and more to the point, study systemicity of story behaviors of people in organizations. I follow Ricoeur (1984) in looking at hermeneutics of story. The grasp of plot comes out of pre-narrative shared definitions of symbols and language, to make such emplotment intelligible. The hermeneutic circle is sensemaking that extends from (1st mimesis) of pre-narrative definitions to (2nd mimesis) emplotment (grasping together characters and a chain of events) into a narrative, and a (3rd mimesis) post-narrative sharing of plot interpretation that becomes the social ground of the next round of pre-narration (see Boje, 2001, chapter on emplotment). Collins and Rainbow (2005) use an antenarrative approach, and are explicit in making a move away from S1 definitions of narrative, such as Gabriel’s (2000: 20). Collins and Rainbow (2005: 11) observe, “… Gabriel’s analysis suggests that Boje’s terse fragments of ‘antenarrative; sensemaking are better understood in terms other than those reserved for storytelling… Disputing Boje’s reservations regarding plots and direction, therefore, Gabriel insists that (properly so-called) stories build on ‘poetic’ qualities, and so, depend upon plots, embroidery and embellishment.” Studies applying antenarrative definitions include Boje, Rosile, Durant, and Luhman (2004), Collins and Rainwater (2005), and Boje and Rosile (2003a). Gabriel and I have found more common grund when it comes to antenarratives. I (Boje 2001: 4) originated an antenarrative theory in which collective storytelling is an interaction of pre-story bets that transformation will occur. Antenarrative is a form of varietymaking bet that a pre-story counterposed by narrative forces of coherence (variety-reduction) can be
transformative, but in non-linear ways. Bruno Latour (1996: 118) argues there is a difference between the linear narrative **diffusion** model (narrative-wholes that erupt fully formed in the mind of Zeus) and the non-linear **whirlwind** model of what I call antenarrative (terse fragments socially distributed across space and time).

**S3: ANTECEDENT PARTS** - The second most utilized story approach to qualitative inquiry in the business and management field is to discern transcendental qualities that are antecedent to retrospection. S3 is antecedent, or *a priori* to S1 or S2 sensemaking. S3 can be Weickian enactment frames. S3 can also be Kant (1781/1900) transcendental theory, there is a transcendental apperception *a priori* to perception by the five senses, and there is a transcendental aesthetic, an inner sense of spatiality and temporality beyond mere S1 empiric or sensory aesthetic representation. If the first mode of knowledge is (S1) narrative retrospective inductive sensemaking of experience into perceptions, then it is Immanuel Kant (1781/1900: 67) who most explicitly theorizes a third mode of knowledge that is *a priori* deductive apperception in story, the “unity of the theme in a play, an oration, or a story” that is beyond retrospective empirical five-senses knowledge. Kant (1781/1990: 4) theorizes that beyond retrospection from our five senses of perception, there is “Pure reason,” which is *transcendental* and antecedent to retrospective sensemaking knowledge, that is a “supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance.” Transcendental (aesthetic) conceptions of space and time are not derived directly from retrospective reflections upon outward experiences. Kant’s transcendental cognizing is not the same as what is taken to be transcendental in more New Age conceptions, such as Wilber’s (1996) four-quadrant framework. Landrum and Gardner (2005) strike a middle ground in positing that corporate strategy is increasingly looking for transcendental logics that incorporate deliberation on Wilber’s four quadrants. Selznick’s (1957: 151) approach to strategy story, seems to take a more conservative position, on that anticipates Polkinghorne’s (1988: 36) definition of narrative as parts and wholes (see Table I.1 for complete definitions). Boyce (1997: 107) defines story in a way that accentuates the antecedent inter-symbolic relationships.

**S4: ANTECEDENT PARTS** – S4 in Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1968, 1973, 1981, 1990) work is all about the dialogisms beyond just polyphonic dialogism. As we shall
explore Bakhtin went beyond Kant’s cognitive architectonics (S3) to look at the interanimation of cognitive with ethic and aesthetic discourses. The more storied unfinalized systemicity definitions includes Bakhtin’s (1981: 60; 1973: 13, 26, 4) typology of dialogisms (polyphonic, stylistic, chronotopic, & architectonic). In Derrida’s work, S4 is the play of differences. Derrida’s (1978) work notes, treating writing as a supplementarity to the oral, an elaboration, not originary. Derrida and Bakhtin make the material marking, such as the writing of story in multi-stylistics the focus. Writing stories, not just orally-telling unresearched terrain in “storytelling organizations.” In Lyotard (1979/1984), as well as Foucault (1977a, b), S4 is the multiplicity of interacting discourses. Studies applying these definitions include Boje, Enríquez, González & Macías (2005) architectonic dialogism analysis of McDonald’s and Wal-Mart, Boje & Rhodes’ (2005a, b) polyphonic dialogism analysis of virtualized leadership.

"Storyist" is a word I invented, so you will not find it in the literature. I believe it is a new paradigm. One finds lots written about the "narrativist turn" (Lyotard, 1984; Polkinghorne, 1988). If we take Bakhtin's dialogisms seriously, it makes sense to posit a "storyist turn" that is beyond (or before) the narrativist turn. I also distinguish between ‘narrative’ defined in ways Aristotelian, versus more ‘storyist’ Kantian transcendental metaphysics, the Bakhtinian ‘dialogic manner of story’ (as in the polypi of dialogisms), and Stein’s aversion to developmental narrative.

HOW BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS USE STORY

There is a billion dollar story consulting industry. Most of it is focused almost exclusively on managerialist dialogues (D1), and prohibits debates (D2). Any debate (D2) approaches to story consulting, are ways to move to D1 (managerial control over dialogue); there is not much polyphonic multi-voice story consulting work. The second most popular approach is to look at the underlying dialectic of antecedent frames or archetypes (D3). There is almost no consulting work being done using D0 here-and-now inquiry into the unfolding present, or D4 multi-discursive intertextuality of the multiple-dialogisms. It is time for story consulting to move from managerialist control (D1) to polyphonic dialogism (D2). Even more important is to make the storyist turn, not just the narrativist turn. The narrative turn, in sum, is D1 → D2, from logocentric dialogue to
polycentric debate. A storyist turn is more about D∅, D3, & D4. A polyphonic praxis of OD breaks down the character masks of monological unity, destroys finalized conceptions of whole system thinking, goes beyond closed philosophy of managerialism, breaks with narratives of the dialectic as well as with organic stages of evolutions. Rather than system wholeness, finalizedness, or merged parts, the focus is on unmergedness and unfinalizedness of systemicity.

**D∅**: It is difficult to find OD practices that focus on the here-and-now. Retrospective approaches subvert here-and-now awareness with a developmental narrative ("proper story") of beginning, middle, and end. Antecedent or reflexive approaches are forward-looking. Stein (1935: 33) says “what is a story?” and replies, a story is “wild and while.” A story is becoming, emerging, ontologically implicated in complexity. A story does not tell all, is never finished, and changes with each performance. A story keeps changing and rearranging the context, chiming different listener stories. The story I tell is not a duplicate of the ones you tell yourself.

**D1: DIALOGUE** - Several OD practices reduce sensemaking to only positive dialogues of convergence. Appreciative Inquiry (AI), for example disallows debate, or any negative science approaches, such as critical theory or deconstruction. The focus is on building a positive renarration. Senge’s *Learning Organization* approach also disallows dialogue; dialogue is controlled to insure managerialist consensus. Denning’s (2000, 2005) *Springboard stories*, follow along, seeking to enable executives feeling out-of-control of social construction, can regain control with two minute rendition of a positive story. Retrospective control story is a limiting act, an act of hegemony, and an act that selects and morphs chaotic elements into more static shapes. Dialogue is not the same as (D2 or D4) dialogicality. Dialogue consulting interventions lack critical and carnivalesque realism; there is not enough dialogic imagination. Dialogue consulting does not achieve the complexity level of D2 fragmented logics (polylogic), or D4 multi-dialogisms. Managerial consensus sacrifices elements of the diversity of locality idea-forces in ways that subverts complexity (D2 → D1 or D4→ D1). The danger to organizations is from monologic centripetal conditions of managerialism occurs where alternative and multiple points of view are driven out by convergent renarration. Local voices are co-opted into marginality.
Figure I.2: Types of Storying & Restorying of Answerability in OD Praxis

**RETROSPECTIVE**

**D1:** Dialogues of convergence with a focus on storying positiveness and consensus in acts of retrospective sensemaking.
Exemplars: Appreciative Inquiry; Senge’s *Learning Organization* ...

**D2:** Debates among polyphonic and polylogic, that are varietymaking.
Exemplars: Hazen’s *Polyphonic Organization*, Mason & Mitroff’s *Devils’ Advocate*, Ansoff’s war rooms ...

**WHOLE**

**D3:** Dialectic convergence of thesis and antithesis into unitymaking themes.
Exemplars: Carr & Lapp’s *psychoanalytic*; Argyris & Schon’s *double loop* ...

**D4:** Multiple discursive dialogisms beyond polyphony to polypi of dialogisms.
Exemplars: Jabri, Adrian & Boje’s *dialogic surplus of meaning* ...

**ANTSCEDEDENT REFLEXIVITY**

**D5:** Here & Now
I did two book reviews (Boje, 2005, AMR; Boje, 2006, Organization Journal).

The D1 approaches are about Knowledge Management (KM) of stories, extracting tacit knowledge using science-sounding protocols to appropriate “knowledge assets.” This type of story science needs to be banned. Caussanel and Soulier (2005) for example, appropriate tacit knowledge from the “primitives” (that is actually how they are stereotyped)! The use of the term “primitives” in referring to skilled-people from whom tacitness is mined, is a slip of the KM tongue, that highlights the suspect nature of appropriation as deskilling. “Primitives” possess tacit skills (competencies) that are mined, with no discussion of their ‘story ownership rights.’ Only managerial rights are presumed. Science protocol such as chrono-causal maps, decision trees, and conversation diagrams are used to remove all “ambiguities and equivocalities” and to reduce narrative structures into mined “narrative atoms” (defined as minimal fragment of speech clauses) so that a computer program (HyperStoria) can perform “global-modeling approach” and “Vector Graphics” (pp. 177-180). As if that was not enough reduction, narrative atoms are then reengineered into a totalized textualization. Its Taylor’s scientific management meets narrative reengineering. Denning’s chapter teaches executives how to launch Springboard [power] stories that can “tame” resistance backlash of counterstories, using deprecating humor. Denning never stops to question if resistance to managerial power can be a good thing. Like Caussanel and Soulier, Their and Erlach, interview (i.e. interrogate) people, reduce their stories to core statements, then textualize a series of short narrative constructions and cognitive maps into document of explicitness that can be distributed to others in the organization. Somewhat less invasive is Peter senge’s (1992) dialogue consulting. The emphasis in dialogue coaching is on the pursuit of order, often defined as overcoming resistance to change through active listening, and attaining consensus. Consensus as a goal of such dialogue processes has been criticized for creating a monologic consulting intervention (Deetz, 2001). People are trained by dialogue consultants to actively listen, to tell better narratives, and to understand metaphor creativity, but not to address the systemic level of language.

D2 DEBATE: Like Senge, for Snowden’s story consulting, all argumentation about what is truth of a narrative, or what is the politics of narrative is avoided. Snowden
escorts dominant raconteurs (expert storytellers with skill) or executives that impose their will -- out of the room when they try to argue (Snowden & Oliver, 2005). Who get to say what to whom, and the nature of how they can or cannot talk is managerialist, because despite the participants doing the process of collection, codification, and archetype classification – the process is decidedly managerialist. We academic experts are “Art-Luddites” helping management construct narratives for planning strategy, or doing some other bidding. We are not like those “Techno-Fabulists” who use mechanistic technology protocols to extract tacitness from narratives. Only Snowden’s patented “Cynefin Methodology” avoids the expert trap of Art-Luddites and Techno-Fabulists. Only Snowden looks at the interplay of order (D1 & D3) and un-order (D2 & D4). Yet, when one asks what is this miracle method, one quickly realizes it is T1 masquerading as what it is not. In a one-day, off site seminar, participants get a lecture by the expert (Snowden) on what is complexity of order, disorder, and un-order. They then work in small groups, where they interview each other, and elicit the narrative structure and function of their narrative fragments. In an undisclosed method step, the small group members decompose the narratives to “produce archetypes” that are not “universal archetypes” but locally situated (Snowden & Oliver, 2005, p. 42). “Sense emergence” is defined as the sense that emerges in the peer interviews, unimpeded by experts in narrative structure. The participants do mass collection of narrative fragments, codify their own sense of narrative structure and do their own classification into archetypes.

There are approaches to OD and strategic change that focus on staged debates among points of view (Ansoff (1980 war games, and Mason and Mitroff (1981) devil’s advocate are examples. It is feasible to look at ways in which lines of emergence can be traced in the intersecting retro-fragments. For example Savall’s (1974, 2000) socioeconomic approach to management (SEAM) focuses on the metascript. Fragments of scripts are noted, and then presented back to clients, so they can reflect on the ways metascript confusion (Savall, Zardet, & Bonnet, 2000). Metascript is defined as the multiplicity of scripts, mostly unwritten ones, that constitute the micro and macro structure, behavior, social dysfunctions, and hidden costs/performance potential of complex organizations (Boje & Rosile, 2003c). Approaching the organization as theatre (or metatheatre) means retrospecting on ways the authors, actors, editors, and spectators...
interact. *Metatheatre* is defined as the multiple and contending theatres that constitute organizations. The Metatheatre can be defined as a network of simultaneous, *TAMARA-esque* stage performances (Boje & Rosile, 2003b, c).

**D3 DIALECTIC**: Carr and Lapp (2005) take a psychoanalytic approach positing a dialectic relation of subconscious and conscious. I agree with Collins’ (1998) critique of Schein for taking an inconsistent position: positing culture as subconscious, then asking people to sift through explicit artifacts of culture. So you are saying Schein missed the reflexivity? Argyris and Schon’s work that looks at reflexivity in double loop learning comes closest to a dialectic approach to story consulting. Snowden’s work, as reviewed above, moves the collection of terse (D2) stories, but without debate, into a quick and easy classification of unifying archetypes. The stories and their content or function is less important than the sense-emergence of archetype configurations.

**D4 DISCURSIVE/DIALOGIC**: Reflexivity situations reflection upon our self in multiple discourses. I have been taking a Bakhtinian approach to discursivity, as interanimation of cognitive, ethic, and aesthetic discourses (i.e. architectonic) in this essay. There just are not multi-discursive consulting approaches. There are examples of consulting by PR firms that orchestrate branding in stories, in advertising an image façade to escape the critique of social movements. This serves to move D4 dialogism into D1 managerialist control stories.

Table I.1, I lists alternative definitions for each way in which story and narrative (or antenarrative) interacts. Rather than story versus narrative, my idea is that story and narrative are hybrid.

**Table I.1: Contrasting Retro-Narrative and Dialogic-Story Definitions**

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>S1: FINALIZED RETROSPECTION NARRATIVE Definitions of sensemaking</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle, 350 BCE 1450b: 25: 233</td>
<td>Narrative requires story to be a <em>proper</em> &quot;imitation of an action that is complete in itself, as a whole of some magnitude... Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end&quot; the definition of coherent narrative (233).</td>
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| Czarniawska, 1997: 78, 1998: vii, 2, 63 | “A story consists of a plot comprising causally related episodes that culminate in a solution to a problem” (1997: 78); “[Stories are] texts that present events developing in time according to (impersonal) causes or (human) intentions.” (1998: vii); “For them to become a narrative, they [stories] require a plot, that is, some way to bring them into a meaningful whole” (1998: 2, addition mine); “data that is
merely chronologically ordered can be said to constitute… 'a story without a plot'” (1998: 63)

Gabriel, 2000: 5, 239, 19-21  
“I shall argue not all narratives are stories; in particular, factual or descriptive accounts of events that aspire at objectivity rather than emotional effect must not be treated as stories” (5); “Stories are narratives with plots and characters, generating emotion in narrator and audience, through a poetic elaboration of symbolic material” (239, italics in original); Boje’s tersely told “you know the story” is a “narrative deskilling,” not a “proper” story, with plot, preventing full collections being built in management, as they are in his version of “organization folklore” (19-21)

[Organization] “Stories recount incidents that appear to be drawn accurately from an oral history of the organization’s past”; “An organizational story focuses on a single, unified sequence of events, apparently drawn from the institution’s history.”

Weick, 1995: 127-129  
“People think narratively rather than argumentatively or paradigmatically” and “organizational realties are based on narration”, “the experience is filtered” by “hindsight” (127); “typically searching for a causal chain”, “the plot follows – either the sequence beginning-middle-end or the sequence situation-transformation-situation. But sequence is the source of sense” (128); “sequencing is a powerful heuristic for sensemaking” (129)
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<th>Source</th>
<th>S2: UNFINALIZED RETROSPECTION NARRATIVE definitions of sensemaking that are varietymaking fragments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Barry &amp; Elmes, 1997: 431</td>
<td>“[Stories are] thematic, sequenced accounts that convey meaning from implied author to implied reader.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boje, 1991: 111; Czarniawska, 2004: 38</td>
<td>“[A story is] an oral or written performance involving two or more people interpreting past or anticipated experience” (Boje, 111); “Boje” found “storytelling in contemporary organizations hardly follows the traditional pattern of a narrator telling a story from the beginning to end in front of an enchanted and attentive audience” (Czarniawska, 2004: 38)</td>
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<td>Ricoeur, 1984: 150</td>
<td>“A story describes a sequence of actions and experiences done or undergone by a certain number of people, whether real or imaginary. These people are presented either in situations that change or act as reacting to such change. In turn, these changes reveal hidden aspects of the situation and the people involved, and engender a new predicament which calls for thought, action, or both. This response to the new situation leads the story towards its conclusion.”</td>
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<th>Sources</th>
<th>S3: FINALIZED ANTECEDENT STORY definitions that are unitymaking sensemaking</th>
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<tr>
<td>Boyce, 1995: 107</td>
<td>“[Storytelling (..) [is] a symbolic form by which groups and organizational members construct shared meaning and collectively centre on that meaning.”</td>
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<td>Kant, 1781/1900: 4, 15, 466</td>
<td>Transcendental knowledge is a “supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance” (p. 4); “Transcendental” as “all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is a priori” (15); Kant limits architectonic to “Pure Reason”, defines “Architectonic” as “the art of constructing a system”, which he specifies as a “systematic unity of knowledge” (466)</td>
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<td>Polkinghorne, 1988: 36</td>
<td>“[A story] serves as lens through which the apparently independent and disconnected elements of existence are seen as related parts of a whole.”</td>
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<td>Selznick, 1957: 151</td>
<td>Institutional stories are about competences, “efforts to state, in the language of uplift and idealism, what is distinctive about the aims and methods of the enterprise.”</td>
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<td>Sources</td>
<td>S4: UNFINALIZED ANTECEDENT STORY definitions that are varietymaking</td>
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<td>Bakhtin, 1981: 60; 1973: 13, 26, 4</td>
<td>“Dialogic manner of the story” (1981: 60); “Narrative genres are always enclosed in a solid an unshakable monological framework” (1973: 13); In dialogism there is a move beyond “systematic monological philosophical finalizedness” (1973: 26); The plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness and the genuine polyphony of full-valued voices... plurality of equal consciousness and their world” (1973: 4).</td>
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<td>Boje, 2001: 1-4</td>
<td>“Antenarrative” is defined as “the fragmented, non-linear, incoherent, collective, unplotted and pre-narrative speculation, a bet” (1), a very improper story can be transformative (4).</td>
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<td>Collins &amp; Rainwater, 2005: 16-31</td>
<td>Takes a “sideways look” at antenarrative, the local and fragmented understandings of Sears’ transformation. Storytelling is not viewed as reflection of organizational reality, but as organic and vital constituents of organizing (p. 20).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stein, 1931: 33</td>
<td>Asks “what is a story?” and replies, a story is “wild and while”, in the continuous present, with many ways of telling that are very telling (1931: 33)</td>
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</tbody>
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